ABSTRACT: Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous and destructive weapons of war. Even though there remains a great deal unknown about these weapons, as they have not been used in combat since 1945, scholars are able to study their effects on foreign policy. This essay demonstrates that when in the setting of conflict between dyad states, the possession of nuclear weapons significantly affects how actors conduct their foreign policy. This is because nuclear weapons shift the dynamic of power between nations, as well as the seriousness and totality of possible destruction. Therefore, nuclear weapons affect states' willingness to take risks and bargain with their counterparts. This will be demonstrated by assessing three different circumstances of nuclear power that relate to modern examples. Such analysis will demonstrate that varying levels of nuclear power yield different foreign policy results and, therefore, nuclear weapons affect how countries conduct their foreign policy.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons have changed the fundamental nature of how countries conduct their foreign policy in the international arena. This essay will demonstrate that nuclear weapons create variations in the balance of power that yield different approaches in how countries conduct their foreign policy, specifically in the area of defense. When there are two states in conflict, each countries' bargaining power and tendency to engage in risk depends on the balance of power associated with the possession, extent of possession, or lack of nuclear weapons between themselves and their counterpart. To demonstrate this, I will first provide a brief background on the importance of nuclear weapons and how they have changed the nature of foreign policy. I will then assert that in a conflict between two state actors, three possible circumstances prevail that represent varying degrees of power due to the possession of nuclear weapons. This includes a nuclear power vs. a non-nuclear power, two symmetric nuclear powers, and two asymmetric nuclear powers. I will look at each situation individually. In doing so, I will demonstrate that the nuclear balance of power between two actors affects how such actors conduct their foreign policy, as there are variations in bargaining power and willingness to engage in risky behavior. As different balances of nuclear power yield different foreign policy outcomes, I will conclude that nuclear weapons affect how states conduct their foreign policy. I will then provide a brief discussion of what these findings mean more generally for the field of international relations and provide suggestions for the future.
BACKGROUND
Nuclear weapons were officially introduced to the world in 1945, when the United States dropped the first-ever atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima and a few days later on Nagasaki, Japan (Barash, 2018, p. 2). These bombs represented not only the most technically advanced military weapons but also the deadliest the world had ever seen (Ross, 2009, pp. 1-3). Nuclear weapons not only have devastating capabilities, but they also require a significant amount of resources, infrastructure, and technological capabilities to build. As a result, these weapons have not been used in conventional warfare since then (Greenemeier, 2013, p. 1). However, after their debut, there was an international scramble as various countries sought to acquire nuclear power along with the prestige associated with doing so. As of 2019, nine nations possess nuclear weapons: The USA, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel (assumed and highly likely but not officially confirmed), India, Pakistan, and North Korea (Ross, 2009, p. 5).
The possession of nuclear weapons has changed the fundamental relationship between countries in conflict and how they conduct their foreign policy (Hills, 2019, p. 2-3). Nuclear weapons have drastically increased the cost of war in addition to changing the strategic nature of how wars are fought. War is no longer a mechanism of direct military confrontation and intervention based on the number of boots on the ground (Kroenig, 2013, p. 142). Instead, nuclear weapons threaten entire countries, with the ability to annihilate millions in a matter of minutes without stepping foot in another country (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, pp. 173-174). Therefore, foreign policy related to defense and conflict has evolved into a game of bargaining and risk-taking between actors. In this essay, risk refers to how much uncertainty and danger an actor is willing to engage in with their opponent, and bargaining refers to the risk or involvement countries participate in when conducting bargaining negotiations. As nuclear weapons are greatly feared, countries that possess them can make credible threats based on their nuclear capabilities. Meaning, the very existence of such weapons affects how actors conduct their foreign policies, as actors can influence their adversaries without having to go through with the threatened action of using nuclear weapons (Wagner, 1982, p. 329).
BALANCES OF POWER: THREE CIRCUMSTANCES
Upon establishing the importance of nuclear weapons, I will now use evidence to support my claim that possessing nuclear weapons affects how countries conduct their foreign policy in terms of defense. I assert three possible circumstances that represent the main balances of nuclear power possible when two states are in conflict: a nuclear power vs. a non-nuclear power, two symmetric nuclear powers, and two asymmetric nuclear powers. I have chosen to divide my argument into these three circumstances because it clearly demonstrates the likely power dynamics that arise between dyad nuclear actors in a conflict, and such circumstances are evident throughout history. The three circumstances will be presented individually. Each circumstance will be linked to an example in order to illustrate how varying levels of nuclear power affects the state's foreign policy regarding bargaining and risk-taking. This will demonstrate that the possession of nuclear weapons creates a balance of power between states, which determines how and to what extent actors are able to bargain effectively and take risks while in conflict. As each circumstance yields different degrees of risk-taking and bargaining, I am able to conclude that nuclear weapons have varying effects on how states conduct their foreign policy in areas of defense based on the nuclear balance of power between two actors in conflict. Therefore, nuclear weapons certainly affect how states conduct their foreign policy.
1. NUCLEAR VS NON-NUCLEAR POWERS
The first nuclear balance of power relationship I will look at is the case between a nuclear power and a non-nuclear actor. This situation is representative of the dynamic between the USA and Iraq. The USA invaded Iraq initially in 2003, partially in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack. In addition, the George W. Bush administration cited that it had reason to believe that Iraq had been developing nuclear weapons, and such development had to be stopped. It was later revealed that the USA knew all along that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons but instead used this excuse to conceal their main motive: to overthrow the country's regime led by Saddam Hussein (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 210-211).
In terms of how the Iraq war was fought, the USA was clearly at a power advantage in terms of military capabilities and nuclear weapons. Therefore, there was no real bargaining that occurred (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 434). Even though nuclear weapons were never used in this conflict or threatened to be used, the USA leveraged its nuclear might, as it asserted its power and ability to make coercive threats. Such threats were credible because the USA held an absolute advantage in nuclear power (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 210-211). Therefore, Iraq had to consider the looming possibility of a nuclear attack when evaluating its foreign policy choices and how much risk it was willing to engage in (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, pp.173-176). In comparison, as the USA dominated in nuclear power, it was willing to act with resolve, acting exceptionally aggressive, and taking strategic risks in its foreign policy as it knew that Iraq did not have the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. This imbalance in the nuclear power dynamic helps to explain why the USA prevailed in the war in Iraq (Kroenig, 2013, pp. 141-142).
2. SYMMETRIC NUCLEAR POWERS
TThe second circumstance I will evaluate represents when two actors in conflict have similar nuclear power. This situation is evident in the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India. This conflict stems from conflicting views of state borders in the Kashmir region and has resulted in a spiral of escalation since 1947 (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, p. 177). As both states are deeply politically involved in the conflict, the stakes are high. Since the countries are so divided, neither is willing to have serious negotiations with the other. However, as the situation of two symmetric nuclear powers is extremely risky, and both sides are aware of this, both sides exercise extreme caution in their risk-taking. This is why they periodically have small skirmishes, but no overt war has been fought (Wagner, 1982, p. 330-333). As neither actor holds an advantage in power, bargaining has been unsuccessful, and both countries have a lot to lose if they engage in too much risk (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 210-211).
In order for the Kashmir conflict to end, one side must be able to gain more power than the other (Wagner, 1982, p. 330-333). However, if the situation becomes too volatile, nuclear standoff could become a realistic possibility. In this case, both actors would be susceptible to the potential signals they perceive from each other. However, nuclear signals are generally not very clear. If an actor engages in too much risk or a state's actions are misunderstood, nuclear war could prevail, risking mutually assured destruction (when both sides use their entire arsenal of nuclear weapons which would lead to the annihilation of both sides). However, the likelihood of this situation occurring remains unclear but is still a possibility (Gartzke and Kroenig, 2016, pp. 398- 400). As of now, it is apparent that the balance of nuclear power between India and Pakistan has affected how both sides have conducted their foreign policy, especially in regard to the amount of bargaining and risk-taking the two actors are willing to engage in (Hinnebusch, 2007, p. 210-211).
3. ASYMMETRIC NUCLEAR POWERS
The final nuclear balance of power I will look at is the relationship between two asymmetric nuclear powers. Such dynamics are evident in the tumultuous relationship between the USA and North Korea. This relationship started nearly 70 years ago during the Korean War. This conflict was between the North, supported by China and the Soviet Union, and the South, supported by the United Nations (predominately made up of American troops). After the North attacked the South, the USA and the Soviet Union mutually agreed to divided Korea along the 38th parallel, creating two separate states known today as North and South Korea. Such actions caused significant strains in the relationship between the USA and North Korea (Griffith, 1975, p. 20-24). More recently, tension has grown between the two actors due to ideological clashes (Greenemeier, 2013, pp. 2-3). And in 2006, when North Korea was declared a nuclear power, the two countries' relationship became even more complicated as the USA does not support North Korea in possessing these weapons (Ross, 2009, p. 5).
As of today, the USA clearly eclipses North Korea in nearly every military avenue, including airpower, missile capabilities, troop numbers, and nuclear technology. However, even though the USA has more powerful nuclear weapons, any type of nuclear weapons, regardless of its relative strength, are serious threats (Greenemeier, 2013, p. 9). Even though it is unclear if North Korea possesses nuclear weapons capable of reaching the USA, they possess ones capable of hitting Japan, a USA ally, and possibly Guam, a USA territory and naval base. Therefore, the USA must actively entertain North Koreas' nuclear threats of deterrence (Hills, 2019, p. 5). Even with this clear asymmetric nuclear power balance between the two actors, both actors are aware of the potential damages and costs of nuclear war. Therefore, both actors conduct their foreign policy with caution and risk aversion (Greenemeier, 2013, p. 9). This is especially evident by the Trump administration, as bargaining between the two actors has appeared to resume. Even though little progress has been made in these negotiations, it is important to recognize that such negotiations are occurring (Hill, 2019, pp. 1-3). Such bargaining is logical because a nuclear war would be costly for both actors; therefore, reaching conclusions using bargaining would benefit both actors. If it were not for North Korea's nuclear capabilities, the USA could easily ignore them, however now that they have nuclear capabilities, no matter how crude, the USA must take their threats seriously.
FURTHER COMMENTS
Having established that the balance of power between two actors in conflict affects how they conduct their foreign policy in terms of bargaining and willingness to take risks, there are a few key takeaways. Even though there has not been a nuclear attack since 1945, it is evident that there is a potential for nuclear weapons to be used irrationally in the future (Wagner, 1982, p. 332). This is especially apparent as multiple countries have positioned their nuclear weapons so that they are ready at a moment's notice. Therefore, if a country misreads another countries signals or is provoked too far, nuclear weapons could be launched quickly, recklessly, and without much thought. This is extremely concerning as countries have the ability to inflict unimaginable damage and destruction that would reach far beyond their intended target and are able to do so impulsively (Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, p. 174).
In attempts to limit the potential usage of nuclear weapons, I suggest that the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, enacted to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, should be strengthened to such an extent that members are able to severely punish actors who deviate from its fundamental values. To do this, members should pledge to enact the strictest possible sanctions on any actor who attempts to develop or gain nuclear weapons, and to do so as a collective group (Barash, 2018, pp. 6-7). The treaty should also place a stronger emphasis on preparing to disarm any opposing actor (Gartzke and Kroenig, 2016, p. 400). Looking forward, there needs to be a more robust international agreement that nuclear weapons should only be used and created to deter war, as the threat of mutually assured destruction should limit any other usage of these weapons (Ross, 2009, p. 2; Barash, 2018, p. 2).
CONCLUSION
The possession of nuclear weapons changes how states conduct their foreign policy, especially related to defense. To come to this conclusion, I first provided a general background on nuclear weapons and their impact on foreign affairs. I then asserted three possible circumstances to illustrate the standard nuclear power relationship between two actors in conflict. These circumstances included: a nuclear power vs. a non-nuclear power, two symmetric nuclear powers, and two asymmetric nuclear powers. Each circumstance was assessed separately and linked to an example. These examples were used to illustrate not only how the possession of nuclear weapons affects the balance of power between actors, but also how this balance leads to varying levels of risk-taking and bargaining that actors are willing to engage in. As each circumstance yielded different levels of risk-taking and bargaining, I concluded that the possession of nuclear weapons affects an actor's foreign policy. I then provided a few final remarks regarding suggestions I would make to prevent the usage of nuclear weapons in future wars.
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